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HABEAS CORPUS: FOURTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS WRIT TO
ISSUE TO STATE PRISONER NOT YET SERVING
SENTENCE UNDER ATTACK
By manipulating the concept of custody to include the legal
effects of a conviction precedent to service of sentence, the Fourth
Circuit has extended the use of the writ of habeas corpus into new
and perhaps questionable areas.
THE wRiT of habeas corpus is the traditional means of securing an
inquiry into the cause of a prisoner's confinement.1 Under the
federal habeas corpus statute, a petitioner requesting the writ must
be in "custody" before federal jurisdiction to review the cause for
confinement may be invoked.2 For purposes of this statute, custody
has always meant physical confinement under a sentence imposed
by an allegedly infirm conviction. In Martin v. Virginia,3 the Fourth
Circuit has abated the stringency of this jurisdictional requirement
by broadening the concept of custody to permit federal court re-
view of a state conviction although the petitioner has not com-
menced serving his sentence under that conviction.
Petitioner Martin had been serving a fifteen-year sentence for
second degree murder when he escaped from prison and committed
grand larceny. He was convicted for the escape and larceny and
sentenced to an additional eight-year imprisonment, to begin at
the expiration of the original murder sentence. The subsequent
convictions rendered Martin ineligible for parole under the murder
sentence for an additional three years. 4 He sought federal court
review of the second conviction by means of a declaratory judg-
ment5 after unsuccessfully petitioning the Virginia state courts for
1 See Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. Rv.
26 (1945).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (1964).
3 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).
' Martin had been convicted of second-degree murder in 1960. He was sentenced
to imprisonment for fifteen years. Under Virginia law, VA. CoDE ANN. § 53-251 (1958),
he would have become eligible for parole under that sentence in 1968. 349 F.2d at 785.
The second sentence was to begin at the expiration of the first and had the effect of
deferring his eligibility for parole under the first sentence until 1966. Id. at 782 n.1.
r Martin alleged that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to retain
counsel of his own choosing and that a court-appointed counsel who represented him
in the later convictions was incompetent and did not effectively represent him.
Id. at 782-83.
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a writ of habeas corpus.6 The federal district court dismissed the
action without a hearing, asserting that the Declaratory Judgment
Act did not provide a substitute for habeas corpus review.7 Upon
appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals chose to treat
the plea as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and held that the
deferral of parole eligibility under the first sentence as a result of
the second conviction satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of
"custody."
A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state
prisoner under the federal habeas corpus statute whenever "he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States."8 This statute and its substantially identical
forerunners9 have traditionally been construed to require that one
The Virginia courts reasoned that since Martin had not commenced serving his
second sentence, he was not "in custody" under such sentence and thus could not
seek review under the Virginia habeas corpus statute. Id. at 783. The statute pro-
vides: "The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum shall be granted ... to any person
. . . showing by affidavits or other evidence probable cause to believe that he is
detained without lawful authority." VA. CODE ANN. § 8-596 (1957).
7 349 F.2d at 783.
828 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (1964).
9 The Judiciary Act of 1789, which made the writ of habeas corpus available to
federal prisoners, provided: "[A]U the before-mentioned courts of the United States
shall have power to issue writs .. .of habeas corpus . . . Provided, That writs of
habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless . .. they are in
custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States ...." Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82. Thereafter, Congress enacted the Federal Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867, which extended the writ to state prisoners. The statute em-
powered the federal courts to issue the writ in all cases where a person was "restrained
of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States." Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. The power to
grant writs of habeas corpus to foreign prisoners in custody within the United States
for acts done in violation of the laws of a foreign nation was conferred upon the
federal courts in 1842. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539.
The sections of these statutes dealing with the custody requirement were con-
solidated in 1875. "The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner
in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States . . . or is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or
treaty of the United States; or, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state . . . is in
custody for an act done ... under any alleged right ... claimed under the . . .sanc-
tion of any foreign state ... or unless it is necessary to bring the petitioner into court
to testify." REv. STAT. §§ 751-53 (1875).
The change in phraseology from "restrained of his or her liberty" as provided
in the 1867 act to "in custody" in the 1875 act had no significant effect, since the
courts required actual confinement under both statutes. See Wales v. Whitney, 114
U.S. 564 (1885); In re Callicot, 4 Fed. Cas. 1075 (No. 2323) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1870).
The phrase "in jail" was dropped from the 1940 edition of the code by the 1948
revision, but the reviser's note, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964), cautioned that changes in
phraseology were made to facilitate the consolidation of provisions relating to the
writ of habeas corpus, which until then had been scattered throughout the code, and
were not designed as substantive alterations.
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seeking a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court show that he was
in actual confinement. 10 Thus, milder forms of restraint such as
parole" or bail12 status were considered insufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court under the habeas corpus statute.
Furthermore, a federal court might lose its jurisdiction if, during the
course of an otherwise proper habeas corpus proceeding, the pe-
titioner were released from custody, since the reason for seeking the
writ, release from physical confinement, would have been satisfied.
Thus, if a prisoner were released on bail or on parole, the federal
10 See In re Rowland, 85 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Ark. 1949), where a petitioner who had
been released on bail was denied a writ, the court noting the presence of the word
"prisoner" in the habeas corpus statute and asserting that this required actual con-
finement. Id. at 552. In Biron v. Collins, 145 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1944), the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus by a conscientious objector who had been assigned to work
one thousand miles from home was denied since he was deemed to be under no actual
restraint by virtue of the order. In re Callicot, supra note 9, involved a petitioner for a
writ of habeas corpus who was denied the writ because a pardon had freed him
of any physical restraint.
The proffered reason for the "actual restraint" requirement was that since the writ
directs that the person detained be brought before the court, it could only be ad-
dressed to those who actually detained the petitioner by physical confinement. See
Sibray v. United States, 185 Fed. 401, 404 (3d Cir. 1911). The requirement of actual
confinement, however, was not limited to detention in jail; it was satisfied by actual
confinement anywhere. For example, in In re McDonald, 16 Fed. Cas. 17 (No. 8751)
(D.C.E.D. Mo. 1861), the writ was issued where the petitioner was confined in a military
post, but not formally detained in jail.
Consistent with the articulated reason for requiring actual confinement, the writ
was also available where immediate means were available to enforce actual confine-
ment. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885). For example, where an officer arrests
someone, he has the authority and the power to confine, and if the arrestee resists,
immediate physical power may be exerted. Id. at 572. In Wales, the Supreme Court
defined custody as "actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it." Id.
at 572. In that case, a naval doctor was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to await
court martial proceedings. The court observed that since the doctor was physically
free to leave Washington, D.C., whenever he chose, there were no immediate means
available for. insuring his continued presence within the city. Thus, the restraint
did not satisfy the custody requirement, the court characterizing it as a mere "moral
restraint." Ibid.
11 Siercovich v. McDonald, 193 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1951) (writ addressed to a warden
dismissed since a prisoner released on parole was no longer in the warden's custody);
Factor v. Fox, 175 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1949) (same); Owens v. United States, 174 F.2d
469 (5th Cir. 1949) (same); Van Meter v. Sanford, 99 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1938) (same,
the court doubting whether parole could be equated with "custody" under any cir-
cumstances).
1 Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 389 (1920); Sibray v. United States, 185 Fed. 401 (3d
Cir. 1911); In re Rowland, 85 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Ark. 1949). But see MacKenzie v.
Barrett, 141 Fed. 964 (7th Cir. 1905), where bail was deemed a sufficient restraint
of liberty to constitute custody because the petitioner was considered to be in the
custody of his sureties. However, this decision has not been followed by other courts.
See In re Rowland, supra, at 555. Also, MacKenzie seems to have been overruled in a
subsequent decision by the some court, United States v. Tittemore, 61 F.2d 909, 910
(7th Cir, 1932).
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court would be without jurisdiction to proceed upon the merits
of the petition.' 3 Moreover, the courts consistently construed the
term "custody" to preclude habeas corpus review of a conviction
where the petitioner had not actually commenced serving the sen-
tence under attack.' 4 Thus, a petitioner serving consecutive sen-
tences could seek review only of that conviction under which he
was presently confined, even though a subsequent conviction might
have affected his eligibility for parole under the prior sentence.15
A significant departure from the requirement of actual confine-
ment occurred in 1963 when the Supreme Court in Jones v. Cun-
ningham'6 held that the conditions and restrictions of parole were
a sufficient restraint to satisfy the requirement of custody.Y The
Court reasoned that "while petitioner's parole releases him from
immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which
significantly confine and restrain his freedom .. ".. 18 Prompted by
2 See Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245, 248 (1912), where the petitioner gave bond and
thus secured a release from physical restraint. The Supreme Court denied the writ,
reasoning that such a release constituted an emancipation from physical restraint,
which the writ was calculated to afford.
14 Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1964); Gailes v. Yeager, 324 F.2d
630 (3d Cir. 1963). In both cases petitioner was required to serve intervening sentences
before he could be granted a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into later convictions.
See Pope v. Huff, 117 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (same); Macomber v. Hudspeth, 115
F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1940) (same); Carter v. Snook, 28 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1928) (same);
DeBara v. United States, 99 Fed. 942 (6th Cir. 1900) (same).
25 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). Petitioner was denied parole eligibility
under a prior sentence as a result of a subsequent conviction. The Supreme Court
held that since the writ is available for inquiring into the legality of a present con-
finement, it could not issue: "A sentence which the prisoner has not begun to serve
cannot be the cause of restraint which the statute makes the subject of inquiry." Id.
at 138. Accord, United States v. Banmiller, 187 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Hoilman
v. Wilkinson, 124 F. Supp. 849 (M.D. Pa. 1954). The Fourth Circuit in Martin ex-
pressly contravened the McNally rule, finding that "the Court has relaxed the strict-
ness of this interpretation and held that one on parole is in 'custody' within the
meaning of the term as used in [28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964)]....." 349 F.2d at 783, citing
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
1371 U.S. 236 (1963).
17 The Jones decision was antedated by several state decisions which deemed
parole to be a sufficient restraint of liberty to constitute the "custody" required
under state habeas corpus statutes. E.g., In re Marzec, 25 Cal. 2d 794, 154 P.2d 873
(1945); Sellers v. Bridges, 153 Fla. 586, 15 So. 2d 293 (1943).
In 1960, it was held in United States v. Brilliant, 274 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1960),
that the release of a federal prisoner on parole would not render the question
of habeas corpus moot, because the petitioner under the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 4203
(1964) was still in the legal custody and control of the Attorney General until the
expiration of the term for which he was sentenced. United States v. Brilliant, supra
at 620.
"8371 U.S. at 243. The parolee is "confined by the parole order to a particular
community, house, and job at the sufferance of his parole officer. He cannot drive
h car without permission. He must periodically report to his parole officer, permit
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this relaxation of the necessary degree of physical control, the Fourth
Circuit in Thomas v. Cunningham9 extended the concept of cus-
tody to permit federal court review of a conviction after the ex-
piration of a sentence. The petitioner in Thomas was awaiting de-
cision on an appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus when his sentence expired and he was released. The
court reasoned that since the effect of the conviction projected be-
yond the termination of the imprisonment, 20 "the ratio decidendi of
Jones v. Cunningham . . . [would suggest] that jurisdiction of the
District Court to adjudicate the validity of the ... sentences survived
the expiration of their imprisonment of [Thomas] .... "21
the officer to visit his home and job at any time, and follow the officer's advice. He
is admonished to keep good company and good hours, work regularly, keep away from
undesirable places, and live a clean, honest and temperate life." Id. at 242.
It has been suggested that the only distinction between parole and probation is
that a parolee serves a period of time in prison, while the probationer never enters
jail. DRFssLE, PROBATION AND PAROLE 13 (1951). Since the restraints of parole and
probation are similar, probation might easily be defined as a sufficient restraint of
liberty to constitute custody. Indeed, a recent Nevada Supreme Court case, Garnick
v. Miller, 403 P.2d 850 (Nev. 1965), held that the disabilities imposed by probation
constituted a sufficient degree of restraint to permit the court to entertain a petition
for the writ under the state habeas corpus statute.
The decision in Jones does not actually overrule Van Meter v. Sanford, 99 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1938), because the latter case merely refused to issue a writ which
was addressed to the warden of the prison rather than to the parolee's parole board.
Il 335 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
20 Id. at 69. Effects persisting past the end of a sentence have been held sufficient
to prove a basis for jurisdiction over actions other than habeas corpus. In Pollard
v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957), an incarcerated prisoner moved under the
federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1954), to vacate his sentence, claiming
that it was unconstitutional because it was imposed for violation of an invalid pro.
bation order. Section 2255 of the code allows a prisoner in custody to request the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate it if (1) it was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or if (2) that court was without jurisdiction to
impose such a sentence, or if (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law. The Supreme Court held that the possibility of collateral consequences was
sufficient to justify decision on the merits although Pollard had been released from
prison after his petition for a writ of certiorari had been granted. Pollard v. United
States, supra at 358. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1954) (the writ
of coram nobis may be utilized to vacate a conviction after sentence had been served
because collateral effects of the conviction continued past the end of the sentence);
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 220-22 (1946) (certiorari proper even though
petitioner released from prison, since future effects of conviction do not render peti-
tioner's cause moot). Thomas is the first decision to apply the collateral effect rationale
in a habeas corpus proceeding.
21335 F.2d at 68-69.
The Thomas court may have been overly presumptuous in its reliance on Jones, where
the parolee was still deemed to be "in custody" under the sentence imposed for the
conviction attacked, since parole is considered a part of the original sentence. 371
U.S. at 242 n.17; see note 30 infra. That decision does not in terms hold that a
conviction could be reviewed by a writ of habeas corpus after the sentence served
thereunder had completely expired.
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While the trend toward a broader construction of "custody" has
made the writ of habeas corpus available to a petitioner on parole
or to a petitioner whose sentence has expired after his petition has
been filed, Martin represents a further erosion of the requirement
of actual restraint. The court equated deferral of parole eligibility
in Martin with the "technical restraint of parole ' 22 which existed in
Jones and found that such deferral was a sufficient restraint of
liberty to constitute custody.23
The Martin decision is a departure from prior precedent 24 and
reflects a shift in emphasis from the more rigid determination of
jurisdiction based on the character of the physical restraints im-
posed to a flexible determination which gives consideration to the
type of legal disabilities attendant to a conviction. Decisions indi-
cate that in order to seek habeas corpus review, the petitioner must
be entitled to immediate release from the custody complained of
should the writ issue.2 5 However, a reversal of the second con-
22 349 F.2d at 784.
23 The court in Martin justified its decision by noting the increasingly liberal
Supreme Court interpretation of the scope of the writ of habeas corpus as exemplified
in Jones and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 349 F.2d at 783. In Fay, the petitioner
was convicted of murder, but did not appeal from the conviction for fear of receiving
a death penalty on retrial. Fay v. Noia, supra at 396-97 n.3. He petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, but the lower federal courts refused to issue the writ because
by not appealing, the petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies. The Supreme
Court held that the petitioner need exhaust only those state remedies available to
him at the time he petitions the federal courts for a writ. Id. at 399. The Martin
court cites Fay as equating "custody" with "restraint of liberty." 349 F.2d at 783.
The particular use of this equation presents an interesting anomaly, since Fay
relied for that proposition on McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). McNally, while
in general terms equating "custody" and "restraint on liberty," id. at 135-36, held that
denial of parole eligibility as a result of a second conviction was not a sufficient
restraint of liberty to constitute custody. Id. at 138. This holding on its facts is directly
contrary to the Martin decision. Thus, it would seem that reliance by the Supreme
Court in Fay on the McNally decision would preclude the Martin court from finding
specific justification in Fay for reaching a conclusion opposite from that reached in
McNally.
2&The decision is clearly contrary to the Supreme Court holding in McNally v.
Hill, supra note 23.
Curiously, the Fourth Circuit in Martin made no reference to the earlier case of
Thomas v. Cunningham, which held that habeas corpus was available to a petitioner
whose sentence had expired while his petition was pending on appeal. Although the
language in the Thomas opinion is shrouded in ambiguity and imprecision, the
Fourth Circuit did assert that "a sentence results in more than physical confinement
and is not spent by the lapse of its stated period. It persists in many aspects beyond
its calendared end. With its effect projecting beyond termination of the imprisonment,
its termination should not foreclose correction." 335 F.2d at 69.
-2 McNally v. Hill, supra note 23; Gailes v. Yeager, 324 F.2d 630 (3d Cir.
1963) (per curiam); Schultz v. Hudspeth, 123 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1941); Pope v. Huff,
117 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Macomber v. Hudspeth, 115 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1940);
see Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524, 525-26 (3d Cir. 1964).
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viction would only entitle Martin to consideration for parole at an
earlier date; it would not release him from confinement under the
first sentence.20 Therefore, the "custody" considered sufficient to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement is not in reality the additional
three-year confinement resulting from the delay in eligibility for
parole occasioned by the second conviction. Rather, "custody" in-
heres in the legal disability collaterally created by the second con-
viction-the deferral of consideration for parole.27 Thus, by equating
custody with the legal disability created rather than with the existing
physical restraint, the requirement of immediate release is satisfied
since removing the second conviction immediately restores Martin's
eligibility for parole.
In equating the "technical restraint of parole" with the "denial
of eligibility for parole," however, the court seemingly ignores the
qualitative differences between the two. The reasoning in Martin
was founded in part upon Jones, in which parole was held to be a
sufficient restraint to constitute custody. Since parole is in theory
considered to be part of the sentence served outside prison walls, 28
20 Talismanic manipulation of the term "restraint" may work to the detriment
of future petitioners. Even if issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would release
Martin on parole, it would not free him from all "restraint" since under the rationale
of Jones, parole also constitutes a restraint. See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying
text. This is illustrated in United States ex rel. Chilcote v. Maroney, 246 F. Supp. 607
(W.D. Pa. 1965), where a prisoner was not allowed to attack an earlier conviction by
means of habeas corpus even though removal of the earlier conviction would confer
on him an immediate right to consideration for parole. The court states that since
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not release the prisoner from confine.
ment, but merely make him eligible for parole, the writ could not issue. In an interest-
ing dictum, the court asserted that if parole was a restraint of liberty sufficient to allow
the issuance of habeas corpus, to grant him a writ in such a case would not free him
from restraint. Id. at 609. Thus Jones is hoist with its own petard. While allowing
the issuance of writs of habeas corpus to those on parole by defining parole as custody,
the case has perhaps foreclosed the possibility of release on any but the most uncondi-
tional basis to those still actually imprisoned. Note that the Martin rationale may avoid
this problem if read -as defining custody in terms of legal disability rather than in
degrees of physical restraint.
27 The Martin opinion cautioned that the decision should not be limited to those
situations where a prisoner is virtually guaranteed parole in the absence of the second
conviction.
"There is... every reason for the court to assume that the parole board would look
with favor upon Martin's application if it were given an opportunity to do so, and
that he would be actually paroled upon becoming eligible for it, or soon thereafter.
"We do not suggest, however, that the principle we glean from Jones v. Cunningham
as applied by us today should be limited to one such as Martin who is able to state
such a strong case for parole consideration." 943 F.2d at 784.
28 Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (1923); United States ex rel. Gutterson v. Thomp-
son, 47 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd per curiam, 135 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 755 (1943).
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the restraint of parole in Jones may be viewed as imposed in service
of a sentence. However, the deferral of parole eligibility in Martin
is a secondary, incidental effect of a conviction and was not directly
imposed by the sentence. Attempting to equate the physical re-
straint imposed by a sentence, however mild, and the collateral
legal consequences of a conviction, regardless of their effect, unduly
blurs the definition of custody.
The expansion of the concept of "custody" seemingly reflects a
judicial policy of affording a petitioner a means of redress for any
adverse legal consequence which might result from a conviction
before or after the sentence has been served. Thus, for example,
loss of the right to vote,29 hold office,30 or to perform jury duty1
might be sufficient grounds alone to support federal jurisdiction.32
If this reasoning is extended, federal habeas corpus might be avail-
able to a petitioner on bail while awaiting state review of his con-
viction,3 3 since the burden imposed by bail of reporting to a court
upon reasonable notice is arguably a legal disability which provides
sufficient grounds for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.34
20 See Note, 37 VA. L. Rxv. 105, 107 (1951).
30 Ibid.
3111d. at 110.
3-In Witte v. Farber, 219 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1955), a federal district court had
denied a petition for habeas corpus review of the state conviction of a police chief for
a misdemeanor. While awaiting appellate review of this decision, the sentence
expired and the petitioner was released. The Third Circuit held that his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus was rendered moot by the expiration of the sentence
and refused to review his conviction even though it resulted in loss of pension pay-
ments. Under a broad reading of Martin and Thomas, this legal detriment alone
might be sufficient to permit a federal court to review the prior conviction. Thomas
is directly apposite to the factual situation in Witte, and is authority for the proposi-
tion that expiration of a sentence during the appellate pendency of a petition will not
render the request for the writ moot. See notes 20-24 supra.
31A petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court must exhaust all
state remedies before seeking the writ. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (per
curiam). This holding is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964). However, in exceptional
circumstances a federal court may issue a writ of habeas coipus even where state
remedies have not been exhausted. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); United
States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925). For example, in In re Loney,
134 U.S. 372 (1890), petitioner was charged with having given perjured testimony
in a federal court case involving a contested congressional election. The writ of
habeas corpus was granted on the ground that to permit him to be prosecuted in
the state courts for testimony given in a federal tribunal would impede the admin-
istration of justice in the federal tribunal. Id. at 375.
31 A person on bail has, by definition, not exhausted all state remedies. Thus, even
if the legal restrictions of bail might be considered sufficient to constitute custody,
the petitioner must, in addition, show that exceptional circumstances exist which
will permit a federal court to review his state conviction. See note 33 supra. Since
bail status is temporary, such a showing might be extremely difficult.
The First Circuit has recently decided in Allen v. United States, 349 F.2d 362 (Ist
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A broad extension of the concept of custody, however, would
seem to extend the scope of the writ far beyond its traditional pur-
pose, which was to command authorities to produce the person
detained in order to inquire into the cause of such detention. 5
Moreover, issuing a writ of habeas corpus years after a sentence has
expired impairs the effectiveness of the review process, because of
the difficulties involved in collecting stale evidence. 6 Alternatively,
where review of a conviction is sought before sentence under that
conviction has commenced, potential interference with the state
administration of justice may result since premature federal review
might not accord proper weight to post-conviction state remedies.3 7
Such policy factors might militate against a broad reading of Martin
and might justify an interpretation more consistent with the original
purpose of the writ. The decision might be construed narrowly to
require that the incidental effects of a conviction must result in
continued "physical confinement" under a previous sentence, in-
cluding the restrictions of parole, before the custody requirement
is satisfied.38 Thus a petitioner on bail would be precluded from
successfully petitioning for the writ since there is no concurrence
of the legal disability with actual restraint. The writ would be
available under this interpretation of custody only in a situation
similar to that in Martin, such as a case where the petitioner's good
Cir. 1965), that bail is an insufficient restraint of liberty to justify the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. The case emphasized that the degree of restraint involved
in parolee status is far greater than that imposed upon one on bail. Id. at 363.
8"See Sibray v. United States, 185 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1911). Some evidence that
Congress has not sanctioned an extension of the writ to cases beyond those originally
envisaged can be inferred from the fact that the federal habeas corpus statute has
remained substantially unaltered since 1867. See note 9 supra.
86 This argument would not be as forceful in situations where habeas corpus review
is sought before the petitioner has commenced serving his sentence. A review at an
earlier date will avoid the problem of stale evidence.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965), a
prisoner serving one sentence was granted a writ of habeas corpus to review a sub-
sequent conviction when the sentence imposed by the latter conviction would not begin
for ten years. The court adverted to staleness of evidence as an important factor in its
decision. Id. at -, 213 A.2d at 621-22. The dissent, id. at -, 213 A.2d at 627, pointed
out, however, that staleness was as much a factor in 1934 when McNally v. Hill,
293 U.S. 131 (1934), was decided as it is today.
37 See notes 33-34 supra.
38It is possible to infer that actual physical imprisonment may still be necessary.
"[W]e are persuaded that from a practical point of view the convictions for escape
and larceny are the real, effective basis of Martin's continuing detention in a penal
institution instead of his being at large, relatively free, though under parole super-
vision . . . . [T]he subsequent convictions which cause the vast difference between
continued confinement . . . and conditional release are in the truest sense a present
restraint upon Martin's liberty." 349 F.2d at 784.
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Vol. 1966: 588] HABEAS CORPUS
behavior credits have been voided by a second conviction, thereby
forcing him to remain in prison for several more years.39
Regardless of the scope of the Martin decision, an erroneous con-
viction which creates a collateral legal disability before or after
service of the sentence imposed demands redress. The expansion
of the concept of custody can bring these situations within the scope
of the writ of habeas corpus. It is questionable, however, whether
the fictionalization of the custody requirement is the most feasible
means of establishing broader federal protection of constitutional
guarantees. Appeal to the Supreme Court upon denial by a state
court of a petition to reopen a constitutionally infirm conviction
may be one alternative method of affording federal review, although
the strictures of certiorari procedure make redress more difficult to
obtain by such a tack. Alternatively, federal protection might be
logically achieved by allowing review in situations similar to Martin
by means of a declaratory judgment" rather than converting the
30 But see, e.g., Wilson v. Bell, 137 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1943). Another example of a
situation squarely covered by a narrow reading of Martin is United States ex tel.
Chilcote v. Maroney, 246 F. Supp. 607 (W. D. Pa. 1965). See note 26 supra.
40 See, e.g., Koyce v. United States Bd. of Parole, 806 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Plaintiff was convicted of murder by a military court-martial and sentenced to a
term of life imprisonment which was later reduced by the Secretary of the Army
to a term of eight years, to end April 30, 1964. He was initially committed to a military
prison but was later transferred to a civilian penitentiary. As a result of good time
credits, he was due to be released January 15, 1962. Id. at 760. A civilian prisoner
released before the termination of his sentence as a result of good time credits is
usually considered as "on parole" until the termination of his sentence. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Taylor, 290 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1961); Howard v. United States, 274 F.2d 100
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 832 (1960). Military prisoners, on the other hand, are
usually released unconditionally when good time credits shorten the period of im-
prisonment. Koyce v. United States Bd. of Parole, supra at 761. Prior to his
release, the petitioner filed suit in the district court against the United States Board
of Parole, seeking a declaratory judgment that parole conditions could not validly be
applied to him upon his release because he had been convicted by military court-
martial. Ibid.
The court held that the jurisdictional question of case or controversy was not
controlled by decisions in habeas corpus proceedings where relief was denied because
sought prior to the time for actual release: "The writ of habeas corpus has its own
special function; it is ordinarily available only to vindicate the right to be free of
restraint at the time the writ is sought, not at some future time. Relief by a declara-
tory judgment is not so limited. It may be had though habeas is not the appropriate
remedy. Appellant was not obliged to wait until released and actually subjected
to the allegedly illegal restraint before obtaining a decision as to the validity of such
restraint." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Note that under the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 4203
(1964), the petitioner as a federal prisoner, would have been in custody for the purpose
of the requirements of the habeas corpus statute when released on parole. See note 17
supra.
The court further held that a justiciable issue had been presented, which could be
adjudicated by means of a declaratory judgment: "When .. . [petitioner] fied suit
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writ of habeas corpus into a judicial panacea by which the federal
courts may cure any legal ill created by a conviction.
there existed a definite legal-impact upon ... [him] due to the administration of his
sentence as one to which parole conditions applied. The impact upon him naturally
would increase when he would be actually subjected to restraints upon his release,
but he need not await a greater impact if there existed a sufficient one. When he
sued there existed a clear legal controversy affecting his status and the conditions of
his confinement and release." Koyce v. United States Bd. of Parole, supra at 761.
Since the complainant in Koyce was allowed to adjudicate the validity of his
status, it would seem that Martin could do so by the same means. There was at
least as much immediate legal impact on Martin by virtue of his second conviction as
there was on Koyce by virtue of his transferral into a civilian prison; and there would
have been a greater impact eventually, since Martin faced continued imprisonment
under the second sentence, while Koyce faced only parole. Where the one situation
presents a justiciable issue, so should the other.
